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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL W. STRAND,

)

Plaintiff and Appellant,

)

vs.

)

Cue No. 16118

JACK CRANNEY, CRANNEY ENTERPRISES,
INC. , and BONNIE CRANNEY,
)

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action for the recovery from defendants of 802,000 shares of
stock in Classic Mining Corporation, alleged to have been pledged as security
for loans.

Defendants counterclaimed that the stock was held by them as

joint venturers with plaintiff, asking the court to wind up the joint venture
affairs and distribute the assets.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following a trial, without a jury, the court dismissed plaintiff's action,
declared that plaintiff and defendants were joint venturers for the purpose of
uwes tmg and trading in the stock. dissolved the joint venture, and directed
J1stribution of the stock to plaintiff and defendants.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents' Statement
[In setting forth the facts as developed at the trial, respondents will refer to

pages of the transcript of trial testimony (Tr.), rather than to pages of the
record (R.), for the sake of consistency with the appellant's brief.]
The appellant, Michael W. Strand, is self -employed ( Tr. 183).

He makes

his living by trading stocks, including those of Classic Mining Corporation,

trying

to

affect

companies.

their price

(Tr. 184), and putting "deals" together for

During the times material to this proceeding, he was putting

together some deals for Classic Mining Corporation (Tr. 184).

The individual

defendants and respondents, Jack Cranney and Bonnie Cranney, are district
managers

of

business

Shaklee

Company

of making films

( Tr. 148) .

( Tr. 229),

and other aids

also

engaged in the

to be used in selling products

They are the principals of Cranney Enterprises, Inc. , and own

Cranney Distributing Company ( Tr. 12).
making

and are

loans

( Tr. 96),

and

were

They are not in the business of

not familiar

with

stocks

and

trading

(Tr. 116).
Strand regarded Bonnie Cranney as an old friend,

having known her

before her marriage to Jack Cranney (Tr. 151).
Jack
March

.J,.

Cranney,
1977.

accompanied

by

Bonnie,

first

met

Strand on about

at a Salt Lake City restaurant. at which time Strand was

trying to put a deal together for Classic :'>lining· Corporation. in\·ol\·mg uranium land.

He told the Cranneys that he thought Classic was a ·:en· ::;cnC:
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investment (Tr. 142).

Jack Cranney then wrote

and told him to invest it for him (Tr. 143).

tum out a check for $1,000

As a result, an 8CCIIWlt

wu

opened in Jack Cranney's name at Olsen and Company, brokers, ad 4,000
shares of Classic Mining Corporation stock were purchaaed and placed Ill tile
account, though the evidence is in contlic:t as to whether the purcbale

wu

made by Jack Cranney or someone else (Tr. 197, 144, 278).
That early March social meeting led to a series of tranaactfona bet1Nea
the Cranneys and Strand.

Later that month, on about March 25, Strand

found himself in need of additional funds, so he telephoned and aalted about
the possibility of a loan.

The Cranneys then loaned

tum $20,000, for wbJch

he gave them 10,000 shares of Classic Mining Corporation stock for

maldnr

the loan, and pledged another 190,000 shares to secure the loan (Tr. 14, 19,
146-147).

The loan was evidenced by a promissory note payable without

interest in three installments, $5,000 on or before April 5, 1977, $5,000 on or
before April 19, and $10,000 on or before May 3.

Strand also executed a

pledge agreement (Ex. 5 and 6) .
The payment due on April 5 was not made, and before April 19 arrived,
Strand was in need of money again.

On April 18, the Cranneys advanced to

Strand an additional $15,000 and received an interest bearing promissory note
(Ex. 7), secured by 100,000 more shares of Classic Mining Corporation stock
(Tr. 14, 19, 148-149).

Up to this point, there are few material conflicts in

the testimony, but there are substantial conflicts respecting the transactions
that followed, which conflicts the trial court had to and did resolve.
On the evening of May 3 Jack Cranney received a call from Strand to
che effect that Strand and Galen Ross, an officer of and counsel for Classic
\Itnmg Corporation. were coming to the Cranney home (Tr. 46).

Ross was
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coming

along

(Tr. 156).

to

corroborate

Strand's

statements

about

Classic

Mining

Cranney was told that they were in desperate need of money,

that they hadn't been able to meet their prior commitments, and that if be
would advance another $20,000, they would form a partnership and get bim
involved in the venture, whereupon Ross negotiated for Strand concerning a
partnership agreement with the Cranneys.

Strand stated that both he and

Ross had serious financial problems and neither one of them had any credit.
They inquired about funds available to the Cranneys and whether their home
had equity upon which Cranney might borrow (Tr. 47).

Strand said that he

would lose everything, and that he needed a partner in the business because
they

just didn't have

the

capitalization

to continue what they were doing

(Tr. 48).
Ross stated that they wanted to change the nature of what had happened
before, and the relationship with respect to the notes would change because
Cranney

was

$20,000,

raising

800,000

becoming

shares

(Tr. 50)

to
of

a

partner.

$56,000 the
Classic

Mining

Cranney was

told

that if he put up

amount he had paid in.
Corporation

stock

into

they
the

would put
partnership

He was told that he would have his $56,000 back by about June 15

and that when his $56.000 had been returned, Strand would receive the next
$56,000.

and then the balance would be split down the middle.

Strand also

indicated that he would include Cranney in other ventures as the company
became larger.
<. Tr.

51).

and the parties discussed preparat10n of a wntten contract

Ross

stated

that

he

would

prepare

the

contract.

being wei:

acquainted with ClassiC Ylinmg Corporatwn and wnh Strand's acti\"ltles ·
.Jack Cranney first saw the written jomt ~,~enture 1greement I, Ex

l'lay 20.

2:2,

At that time he had already gl\'en Stnnd the Jdd1tlcnal :S:::u.! UL·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- ±-

He had called several times (Tr. 52) to see it tbe

no stock had been put up.

contract would be prepared, then went to Ross's office where Rosa pulled out
a contract and let Cranney read through it.

Strand came in at about that

same time, reached over Cranney's left shoulder and signed tbe acreement.
Cranney did not sign at that time because the contract didn't state how much
stock

was

(Tr. 53),

involved,
a

and specified that only Strand could sell tbe stock

provision

that

originated with

Ross

(Tr. 250).

Otherwise,

Cranney was in agreement with the form of the contract (Tr. 53, 58).
November

or

December,

Cranney

obtained

a

In

copy of the joint venture

agreement (Ex. 8) from Ross, but this one did not have Strand's signature
on

it

(Tr. 54).

On May 3,

according to

Cranney's testimony,

he had

specified that he would like to be able to liquidate stock if they defaulted in
the agreement ( Tr. 56), and this was discussed in general terms (Tr. 57).
The partnership property was kept in what the parties called "the box",
which was a safety deposit box maintained by Cranney.

At the time Cranney

went to the offices of Galen Ross on May 19 he was told by Ross or Strand
that in order to bring the box up to the promised 800,000 shares it was
necessary

for

Strand

Company (Tr. 23).

to

recover

some

stock

that he had

at Olsen and

He told Cranney that he, Strand, had $30,000 coming on

:v!onday and that if Cranney would give him a check for $29,250. he would get
the

stock

Cr·anney
agreement

from
could
(Tr

Olsen
put
24) .

and

the

Company

stock

in

and

deliver

it to Cranney,

so that

the box and list it in the partnership

Cranney agreed to put up the $29.250 provided he

.\'·~uld recei\·e a check made out by Ross at the same time which he would be

Jt,Je to present on the following ;';londay (Tr
·~td

th3t

h1s

check would be good

68)

Ross agreed to this and

As it turned out, Cranney's $29.250
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check was paid by his bank on the same day it was issued, a representative
from Olsen and Company having driven to the bank and collected (Tr. 69),
but the check from Ross was never honored (Tr. 70).

At that time the

Classic Mining Corporation stock was trading at 14 to 16 cents per share
(Tr. 25).
Thereafter, Cranney made some efforts to get his $29, Dee--back, but was
not

successful.

Strand

gave

Cranney

a

check

drawn

on

"Big Indian

Associates" in the amount of $17,000, but it bounced (Tr. 16).

On May 24,

Cranney called Strand and asked about the $29,250 which he felt had been
"expropriated" from him and was told that neither Strand nor Ross could come
up with the money ( Tr. 59).

He asked what they were going to do about it

and whether something additional was going to be put into the partnership for
the

money.

attorney,

On May 31,

having learned

Strand brought an

additional

that Cranney had consulted an
200,000 shares

to

raise the total

shares in the box to 954,000 ( Tr. 60), then added 80,000 shares of restricted
stock borrowed from Ross (Tr. 170).
In order to come up with some money, Strand put 125,000 shares in
Cranney's

account

and made

arrangements

to

sell it.

It was

Cranney received $20,000 from Olsen and Company (Tr. 171).

sold, and
There were

25,000 shares left in the account which Cranney later took out and delivered
to Strand (Tr. 172).
The Cranneys' contributions to the joint venture had not yet ended

In

August. while the Cranneys were in Las Vegas. Nevada, they received a cal:
from Strand who said he needed additional cash.

They arranged to ha\'e

3

Salt Lake City bank deliver hun a cashier's check in the amount of $12 · OOC
( Tr. 37).

Before ad\·ancmg the $12.000 Cranney had been told b\· Strar.~
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that $5,000 would go in as investment into a limited partnership, but tbja
investment was never made.
The testimony is that the Cranneys cave $1,000 to Strad oa Mai'Cb t
(Tr. 13), $20,000 on March 25, $15,000 on April 18, $20,000 oa May t, .ad
$12,000 on August 12; also that Cranney had paid $29,250 to OIMD md
Company in

the

transaction ot May 19 (Tr. 14).

The total paid by the

Cranneys to or in behalt ot Strand was $97,250.
Stock was deposited with Cranney and placed in the boz in the tollowinc
amounts :

4, 000 shares on March 5, 1977, 200,000 on March 25, 100,000 on
In

April 18, 450,000 on May 19, 200,000 on May 31, and 80,000 on July 4.

addition, 25,000 shares had been lett in the account established tor Cranney
at Olsen and Company, making a total of 1,059,000 shares delivered, one way
or another, to the Cranneys (Tr. 19).
Of this stock, Cranney made some sales.

On June 30 and July 15, 1977,

he sold 44,000 shares for $10,017 (Tr. 17), at the end ot January 1978, he
sold

10,000 shares

for

$5,435,

and

on

or

about

February 1,

sold

$13,000 shares for $6,795 (Tr. 18).
He returned some shares to Strand, 110,000 on August 9 and 55,000 on
December 23.

He also gave Strand the 25,000 shares that had been lett in

his account at Olsen and Company.

This left 802,000 shares in his possession

at the time of trial.
Although
partnership,
Kcasions.

Strand

took

the

position at

the

trial that

there was

no

he had confirmed the existence of the partnership on several
On October 22, 1977, the Cranneys met with Strand in an attempt

:o g-et a better understanding of his view of the partnership.

Strand was

Jsked to state what they were partners in, because he had not produced the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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documenta.

At

that

time Strand said they

i.e. 1 the million shares 1 the oil well I
royalties

( Tr. 64) .

The

Cranneys

were

partners in

the box,

royalties from the uranium 1 and oil
made

notes

during

this

conversation

(!z. 9) 1 and both Jack and Bonnie Cranney testified to this conversation
On May 251 19771 at the home of the Cranneys, Strand asked a

(Tr. 257).

friend of the Cranney a I
stocks.

Heaton, if she wanted to invest some

Ruby M.

At that time he talked about oil, and said that the partners were the

Cranneys,

Galen

Ross,

and himself

~ Tr.

267-268) .

Shirley

Jackson saw

Strand many times in the Cranney home and would hear Strand say to Jack
Cranney,

"How's my partner?" (Tr. 269).

She heard Strand mention that

800,000 shares were in the partnership and that the two of them were each to
take out $56,000 and then divide the balance ( Tr. 270).

This was at the time

Strand needed the $20,000 on about May 4 (Tr. 271).
At

the

time of the

trading

for

about

trial,

80 cents

the Classic Mining Corporation stock was

per

share,

but

during

transactions in question the price was much lower.

the

times

of the

At the time of the May 4

joint venture agreement the total amount of stock to be pledged would not
have

been

(Tr. 129).

worth

much

more

than

the

$56, 000,

according

to

Cranney

Quotations of bid and asked prices in the Utah Enterprise showed

the following:
Date

Bid

March 21, 1977
April 18, 1977
May ·L 1977
May 11, 1977
May 16. 1977
May 25, 1977

$ .28

.15
.18
18
.15
.17

Asked
$

32
20
22
22
16
21
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(R. 284).

The prices set forth in the Enterpriae are accurate enoup to

pve

a refiection of what a security did during a particular week (Tr. 225).
Some of the documents involved in the transactioD contained ret••c••
to loans, but these were explained by Cranney to the satiafactloa of the trial
court (Tr. 101-114).

Notes were signed Cor the two loans prior to Ma7 4,

but not Cor moneys received by Strand thereatter.

Comments on Appellant's Statement
Respondents are in agreement with some of appellant's StatemeDt of
Facts, but it is inaccurate in many respects, and misleadinr in others.
On page 5, it is stated that "Cor some unexplained reason," Cranney wu
willing to advance additional moneys Cor a partnership although unwilling to
lend any more money to Strand.

The reason was explained.

The stock to be

put into the partnership was to be increased to 800,000 shares (Tr. SO); by
June 15, Cranney would recoup $56,000; Strand promised to include Cranney
in other ventures;

and Classic Mining was "really going to go" (Tr. 51).

Also on page 5, it is said that "the other participant in the meeting"
denied that a partnership was agreed to.

The reference is to Galen Ross,

Strand's close associate, who went to the meeting to help Strand (Tr. 56),
and whom the court could regard as working hand-in-glove with Strand.
other
( Tr

"other

participant,"

Bonnie

Cranney,

confirmed

the

The

agreement

256-260), as did a visitor in the Cranney home (Tr. 270).

On pages 6 and 7 of his brief, appellant sets out 13 "undisputed facts,"
each of wh1ch deserves comment.
The voucher ~ ~ ~ $20,000 check on the April 18 (sic) meeting
J1d not state ''partnersh1p contribution," but "Loan on stock 400,000 shares
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of

£!!!.!!£

Mining."

But Cranney testified that he used the term "loan"

loosely, not having had business training (Tr. 101); that there was never an
occasion on which 400,000 shares changed hands, and his secretary might
have put the notation on the voucher, since she sometimes "just codes things
and does them" (Tr. 103).
2.

The defendant did not cancel the two previous promissory notes.

True, but he did not attempt to enforce them, either.
3.
~

When Cranney delivered
~

Strand

referred

som~

stock back to Strand, the receipt

to receiving collateral.

The receipt (Ex. 17)

reads:
Received from Jack Cranney 100, 000 shares of classic
stock against the "box" held by Jack for collateral and is
to be returned as soon as possible.
Mike Strand
But Cranney did not write the receipt.

He testified, at Tr. 112:

I told Mr. Strand that I thought we're giving him that
much stock that he should give us something back for it
in the form of a hand receipt.
And he wrote that one
out and flipped it to me and walked out the door.
4.

The

plaintiff

himself

was

unaware

of

all

partnership or the extent of the partnership property.
terms:

800,000 shares, $56,000 to him,

what

else

was

to

double-talked by Strand.

go

into

the

terms

50-51, 256).

partnership

of

the

He knew the essential

then $56,000 to Strand,

the balance--and so did Bonnie Cranney ( Tr
of

the

then split

He was not sure

because

he

was

being

But the court agreed that there was no enforceable

agreement as to property other than the Classic stock

Strand was carefu;

not to be too explicit about uranium and oil.
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5.

9!!!!£

There ~ no agreement !! to when the

be sold, ~ who would decide when to sell.

Mintnr stock !!!!!!:~!!

Enough to renerate $58,000

would be sold by June 15, then Strand could sell enourh to obtain $58,000
(Tr. 51), then the stock would be split (Tr. 51, 256), and either party could
sell after June 15 ( Tr. 260) .
6.

The written agreement

~

unsatisfactory with Cranney becauae

gave Strand authority to decide when to sell, and

!!

~ "~

!!

known" bow

The written agreement prepared by

much stock would be in the partnership.

Ross differed from the oral agreement previously reached.

The right of

Cranney to liquidate stock had been discussed in general terms on May 3
(Tr. 56), and the provision for Strand to control sales was Ross's idea when
he

drafted

the

contract

(Tr. 250).

It

was known how much stock was

involved--BOO, 000 shares--but Ross hadn't put it in the agreement.
7.

Cranney did not consider himself bound

the stock.

~

Strand's transactions in

The testimony referred to relates to a single transaction in which

Strand wanted to sell all of the stock to a man named Barra, but would not
tell Cranney any of the specifics (Tr. 136).

Cranney would have felt bound

by Strand's sale of his own half (Tr. 137).

8.

Cranney
unW

he'd

considered
recouped

he
the

had

a right

$56,000.

to

The

sell without consulting
joint venture agreement

prepared by Ross so provided (Ex. 8, Par. 2), and Cranney did not make
any sales prior to June 15 ( Tr. 17), some time after he'd been misled into
partmg with another $29,250.
9

:'-lo

Partnership

books

were

set

t,!£

This

is

true,

but
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not

10.

~

!!!!

~

authority obtained to do business as ! partners~.

There was no contention that any authority or license was needed.
11.

Only Cranney,

Not quite true.

!!2!

Strand, had~ to the partnership properti.

Cranney had the key to the box, but Strand was able to get

stock on at least two occassions (Tr. 19-20).
12.

Cranney's notes "how

~ ~

partners?" and testimony that he

! partner in "one-half of Srand's action" shows the indefiniteness
partnership agreement.

The notes don't show that.

~

~

the

Cranney testified that

be wanted Strand to specify what they were partners in, because he had not
produced the documents he had promised Cranney (Tr. 64), and they wanted
to understand why Strand had changed his ideas (Tr. 263-264).
13.

The parties treated the transaction as ! loan and not

~

partnership.

Although Strand had executed notes for the two loans in March and April, he
did not do so thereafter.

He thinks he may have signed a note for the

$12,000 he obtained from Walker Bank in August, he was unable to produce
any note (Tr. 195).
CPA,
codes

The Cranneys' books were set up by Dennis Beal, a

who assigned a code number to Strand, which never changed.
were

(Tr. 151-152).

placed

on

Cranney

checks

by

the

CPA

or

a

The

secretary

The endorsement on the $10,000 Nuepetco check given to

Cranney by Strand was a self-serving statement placed on the check by
Strand, without discussing it with Cranney ( Tr. 205), not long before suit
was brought.

Strand admitted that Cranney talked about taking 55.000 out oi

Cranneys' side and 55,000 out of his side for $10,000 each (Tr. 205).
The appellant's characterization of the $29.250 transaction in late :'>lal·
(page 8). is not accurate.

Cranney testlfied that the $29. ~50 was to bnM

the box up to 800,000 shares. not to buy and sell stock

l

Tr

·~:3

1

The mum
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was requested by Strand, but Ross agreed to put up b.ia cbec:k··to be

p-.s

on the following Monday.
Page 11 refers to sales of stock by Cranney without the CODMD.t, or
even advice, of bis partner, Strand.

But tb.ia was pendallible UDder the

agreement, June 15 having come and gone (Tr. 51, Ez. 22).
Other inaccuracies appear on pages 11 and 12, but they are repetitloua
and already have been discussed.

ARGUMENT

THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE PARTIES WERE JOINT
VENTURERS IN THE STOCK OF CLASSIC MINING CORPORATION.
Appellant has conceived a paradigm of a joint venture agreement and,
confusing the necessary with the desirable, argues that there couldn't have
been a joint venture agreement because the parties did not follow Rabkin and
Johnson's checklist.

But the argument must fail.

The courts simply have

not required that degree of precision in order to find the existence of a joint
venture.
Although we have found no Utah cases establishing the specificity required for an enforceable joint venture agreement, other state and federal
courts have spoken frequently.

Replogle

~

Ray, 48 Cal. App. 2d 291, 119

P 2d 980, 983 ( 1942), involved litigation between an attorney-at-law who was

also an inventor, and an associate of his who furnished financial assistance.
It was established without substantial dispute there was an agreement of joint
•:enture by wh1ch the parties were to share in the proportions of two-thirds
ro the mventor and one-third to the investor, but the other details of the
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agreement relating to the scope and duration of the joint venture were issues

in the litigation.

In discussing the joint venture agreement, the California

Court or Appeals said:
Preliminarily, it may be stated that there was never any formal
written agreement between the parties defining precisely their
respective rights and duties in their joint venture. * * * As the
details or the agreement of joint venture had not been reduced to
writing, it was necessary for the trial court to determine the
question o( the scope and duration of the joint venture from the
above-mentioned testimony of Replogle [the inventor] and the
inferences which might properly be drawn therefrom.
Even the
testimony of Replogle on the details of the arrangements between
these men was not very definite and certain.
He used such
expressions as "the arrangement as near as I can define it was
* * *", and "the arrangement was something like this * *". But
these considerations are not fatal to the finding of the existence of
a joint venture with the necessary incidental findings of the scope
and duration thereof. As was said in Andrews v. Bush, 109 Cal.
App. 511, at p. 517, 293 P. 152, 154:
"The law requires little
formality in the creation of a joint adventure.
Anderson v. Blair,
202 Ala. 209, 80 So. 31, 35.
Such an agreement is notinvalid
because of indefiniteness in respect to its details.
33 C. J. 848.
* * In considering whether or not a relationship such as that of
joint adventurers or partners has been created, the courts are
guided, not only by the spoken or written words of the contracting
parties, but also by their acts."

*

*

In upholding the joint venture agreement, the court observed that since
existence of the joint venture had been established, "it was necessary for the
trial court to determine the scope and duration of that venture,'' which 1s
somewhat

the

Cranneys,

case

here.

There

is

compelling testimony

by

both of the

supported by a draft version of a joint venture agreement and

testimony of two visitors in the Cranney home. that the parties had agreed
upon a joint \'enture involving a fifty-fifty di\'1SlOn of the profits after eacr.
of

them

had

Corporation.
duration

of

recovered

$56,000

from

sale

of

stock

m

Class1c

:>linin;

It was. therefore. the court's duty ro determme the scope 1n:
the

property of the

joint venture
]Om t

and to rule upon the parues

r·:ghts

\·en ture.
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ill

:he

In Dean Vincent, Inc. ~· Russell's Realty, Inc., 268 Ore. 456, 521 P.2d
334, 338 (1974), one real estate broker claimed to be a joint venturer wtth

another broker in the sale of real property.
defendant,

It was eatabliabed that the

which had a listing on the property in question, bad told the

plaintiff that it was a practice of the defendant to work "on a 50/50 co-op
basis , all things being equal. "
was mentioned.

In other correspondence, also,

&D

even aplit

As a result, the plaintiff produced some prospective buyers,

but the sale was made, ultimately, by the defendant with little help from the
plaintiff because of a personality conflict between the plaintiff's salesman and
the purchaser.

Because of this, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was

not entitled to an even split of the commission, but to some lesser amount.
The defendants contended that there was no express agreement concerning
commissions, and no joint venture.
After noting that a joint adventure is never presumed and that the
burden of establishing it is upon the party alleging it, that joint ventures
need not be expressed but may be implied in whole or in part, and that
equity would look through the entire transaction in order to promote justice,
the Supreme Court of Oregon said:
It has also been said that the usual rule of contract law to the
effect that the terms of a contract must be definite and certain is
enforced less vigorously in contracts of joint venture than in other
types of contracts, particularly in cases in which the joint venture
is not wholly executory, but has been wholly or partly executed

***
Thus. even though there has been no express agreement on
the subject of dividing the profits of a JOint venture. the law may
unply an agreement for equal diV1Sion of any profits .. Indeed. when
two parties enter into a JOint venture the pnma faCie l.Ilference 15
that they are equally interested and entitled to an equal share of
em y profits. lil the absence of e•:idence to the contrary
[ CttatJons
omitted ]
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The court held that the plaintiff real estate broker was entitled to share
equally in the $50,000 commission earned on sale o! the ranch .
Hore !.:_ George, 27 Wyo. 423, 200 P. 96, 18 A.L.R. 469, 474 (1921),
involved the purchase and sale o! real property !or a profit, in connection
with which the plaintiff claimed to be a joint venturer with the defendant who
bad put up the money, purchased the property, and sold it.
joint

venture

was

found

in

a

note written

to Hoge,

Evidence of the

and

testimony of

discussions concerning purchase and sale of the property, but there was no
express agreement with respect to the division of the profits or the sharing
of losses.

The plaintiff had in fact assisted defendant in the purchase of the

property and in locating a purchaser to whom to sell it, but the defendant
contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish a joint venture and
that the trial court should have directed a verdict in his favor.

In holding

that there was a joint venture, the Wyoming Supreme Court said:
We have stated the evidence sufficiently, we think, to show
that there was substantial ground for a finding that the parties to
this action intended to, and did, join their efforts in the venture of
buying and reselling the Riverside ranch, and that they were to
share the profits. To justify such a finding it was not necessary
that the rights and duties of the parties to the contract of joint
adventure should have been more particularly specified or defined.
In Goss v. Lanin, 170 Iowa 57, 152 N. W. -!3, cited by this court in
Reece v .-R~s, supra (25 Wyo. 91, 165 P. 449], it was said:
"It is true that it is not necessary that there should be a specific,
formal agreement to enter into a joint enterprise, or that the
interests of the parties should be definitely settled in such
agreement or that there should be a formal agreement as to the
sharing in the profits.
If there be a jomt enterprise proven.
either by direct evidence of a mutual agreement to that end, or by
proof of facts and circumstances from which it is made to appear
that such enterprise was in fact entered into, the law fixes their
rights."
In Robie ':::'..:. Ofgant, 306 F 2d 656. 659 d Cir
both experienced automobile dealers

1962). the parties were

The plamtlff mforrned the defendant ::
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an opportunity tor an automobile agency in San Juan,
defendant would finance it.

Alter defendant allegedly

p~

to p,.....

the financing plaintiff moved to San Juan and took steps to start the buata.e
but defendant did not pertorm and plaintiff brought suit and obbiaed a
verdict.

On appeal defendant claUDed the evidence was too incletfDite u

to

terms to permit a finding that any contract was entered into, but tbe Court
of Appeals affirmed, saying:

***

It is true that the details of the loans bad not been
determined, nor the extent that defendant's capital part:ici.pation
would be represented by stock and by indebtedness. But we thiDk
that the jury could be permitted to find that since defendant's ciUef
contribution was the financing, plaintiff's share of the net profits
was to be computed before all financing charges.
[Citation
omitted.] Hence it was a matter of indifference whether or bow
defendant divided his share, it any, between dividends and
interest.
Nor was the agreement illusory because no term was
stated for plaintiff's employment.
Even though there wu no
specified term, having in mind that plaintiff was the finder and
entrepreneur we think the jury could well find an implied
undertaking that defendant's support, and plaintiff's participation,
would last a reasonable length of time.

***

In

Lord~

Pathe News, Inc., 97F.2d 508 (2 Cir. 1938), Judge Swan

quoted from a leading Alabama case as follows:
"It may be said, no doubt, of the great majority of contracts
of joint adventure and of partnership, that they do not point out
precisely what each party is to do under them. Such a provision is
quite unusual, and, we should say, quite impossible in many cases.

* * *"
In his argument to this court,

the appellant has pointed out certain

matters that he believes were essential for a joint venture:
control, and the sharing of losses as well as profits.

the right to

But these matters, like

others, may be implied, or may be provided by legal principles found in the
partnership act,

which has been held to govern where the rights of the

parties have not been made explicit in the joint venture agreement.
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In Holtz v.

United Plumbing and Heating Co. , Inc. , 49 Cal. 2d 501,

319 P. 2d 617, 620 (1957), the Supreme Court of California said:
It bas generally been recognized that in order to create a joint
venture there must be an agreement between the parties under
which they have a community of interest, that is, a joint interest,
in a common business undertaking, an understanding as to the
sharing of profits and losses, and a right of joint control. Such an
agreement, however, need not be formal or definite in every detail
relating to the respective rights and duties of the parties but may
be implied as a reasonable deduction from their acts and
declarations .

***

***

The matter of losses apparently was never discussed,
but, since this was a cost plus transaction, the chance of loss was
rather remote. Moreover, an understanding as to the division of
the profits ordinarily carries with it, in the absence of an express
agreement to the contrary, an implied obligation to share losses in
the same proportion.

***

Similarly holding that an express agreement with respect to the sharing
of

losses

is

not

essential is

Minute Maid

291 F.2d 577 583 (5 Cir. 1961), and in
435,

261 P. 2d 529,

contention

that

~

Foster~·

~·

United Foods,

Inc ..

Keating, 120 Cal. App.2d

539 (1953), the California Court of Appeals rejected a

there

could

be

no

joint venture where the parties have

unequal control of operations, citing Sime ~ Malouf, 95 Cal.

App. 2d 82.

95-96, 212 P.2d 946, modified 213 P.2d 788 (1950).
The appellant also has argued,

at some length, that the partnership

agreement was too uncertain because of the uncertainty with respect to the
assets other than Classic Mining stock that would be in the joint venture
This argument is answered by the fact that the trial court did not find a
joint venture agreement with respect to the uranium and oil. which had beer.
left indefinite and uncertain, but only with respect to the stock. which net
only

had been agreed upon but which

had m fact been deli\·ered to the

Cranneys.
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In Lasry !.:_ Lederman, 147 Cal. App.2d 480, 305 P.2d 863, 667 (195'1),
plaintiff relied upon an oral agreement whereby be and defendants bad fonaed
a partnership or joint venture for the purpose of purcbaamr, ezploittnr. and
reselling real property.

The trial court's finding that the oral undentanc:UDr

was too indefinite to create a joint venture was reversed on appeal.

Tbe

appellate court said:
It is true that the agreement to which plaintiff testified wu
indefinite with respect to the improvements that would be found
desirable in order to place the property in satisfactory condition for
occupancy.
This, however, was a matter as to which agreement
was not required before the property was purchased.
It wu
something that might have required a considerable amount of study
and the consideration of the needs of prospective tenants. If these
were matters as to which the parties did not disagree the fact that
they did not agree or attempt to agree on a definite plan of
improvement would not render incomplete the agreement to engage
in a joint venture. The law requires little formality in the creation
of a joint venture and the agreement is not invalid because it may
be indefinite with respect to its detail.

In its opinion the court noted that even though the parties may have reached
no

definite

agreement

for

management

of

the

property,

it

would

necessarily follow that they did not reach an agreement !£ acquire it.

not

In the

present case too, even though the court might find that the parties reached
no definite agreement with respect to the acquisition of uranium property and
oil wells, they did reach a definite agreement with respect to the acquisition
and sale of Classic Mining Corporation's stock.

There is nothing in the

evidence to suggest that the venture in the stock was dependent upon the
\'enture in the other property
The appellant has cited a number of cases from this court which touch.
margmally. upon joint ventures. but none of them suggests a different result
m this case than that reached by the trial court.
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Four of the cases are cited only for the proposition that joint ventures
are in the nature of partnerships, subject to the law of partnership, and with

this we bave no serious disagreement.
McMillan

v.

Whitley,

38 Utah

452,

113 P.

1026

(1911)

involves an

ap-eement among six people to unite in the purchase and sale from time to
time of the stock of the Daly West Mining Company, the court being called
upon to determine the rights as between the various parties with respect to
contributions under the agreement.

The court was not called upon to give a

name to the relationship between the various parties, and did not discuss the
elements of a joint venture, but the agreement was upheld.
~

Bates

Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P. 2d 749 ( 1952), involved two used

car dealers who operated separate businesses out of the same car lot.

There

was no agreement to share any profits, there was no sharing of profits, and
the parties did not operate in any joint manner.

There was no evidence that

either of the parties acted or intended to act as joint venturers.

The court

recognized that a joint venture is in the nature of a partnership but could
not

find

any

facts

indicating

that

the

parties'

operations were in any wise like a partnership.
believable

evidence of

an

contiguous

but several

In the present case. there is

intention on the part of both Strand and the

Cranneys to enter into a joint venture agreement for investment and sale oi
the stock of Classic Mining Corporation.
In Johanson Bros. Builders v. Board of Re\'iew. 118 Utah 384, 222 P Zd

563 ( 1950).

the question was whether some contractors were employers o:·

young workmen or were partners with them.
unemployment

contributions

The

ev1dence

Johanson brothers entered in to arran gem en t s

t~ \.

for purposes of liability io~
established

that

while

wh1ch the1r

•,,··~·d~men
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\\ere

tho

share in the profits, the Johanson brothers operated the contractblr buaiD...
as

their

own.

The

entrepreneurs

referred

to

uaociatton u

the

a

"brotherhood,"

they entered into the contracts and received the _.,.,

controlled

bank

the

contracting .

account,

owned

the

equipment and did aD of 11M

The compensation was not on any fixed perceDtare bama, •d

was determined by the group, based on experience and

forth.

10

The JOQDC

workmen did not consider themselves to be partners, believing that theJ nre
just working for Johanson.

The court determined that tor the purpo... of

the Employment Security Act the Johansons were not joint venturers with the
workmen and were liable tor the statutory contributions.
Vern

Shutte and Sons !.:. Broadbent, 24 Utah 2d 415, 473 P.2d 885

(1970), involved a cattle feeding contract under which one Fredrickaon wu to
take possession of and feed, at his sole cost and expense, Broadbent's cattle,
and as compensation was to receive 15 cents per pound gain in weight made
by the cattle during the period in which he was feeding them.
also fed cattle under similar arrangements for other people.

Frederickaon
There was no

agreement to share profit as such, and when an action was bought against
Broadbent for indebtedness incurred by Frederickson.
held there was no joint venture.

the court properly

This court's opinion did indicate that an

agreement, express or implied, for the sharing of profits is necessary, and
that "the profit accruing must be joint and not several."

The court didn't

explain what that meant. and the appellant suggests that the profits were
several. rather than joint. in the instant case. but it is difficult to see how
he comes to this conclusion.
that in the case cited

The arrangement here is very different from

After the two $56.000 sums were paid to Strand and

~he Cranneys. the parties would each own one-half of the remaining securities

;nd Sponsored
would byshare
equaUy in the profits. which should be ··Joint"' enough
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Busett ~ Baker,

530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974), contains some language,

which the appellant regards as helpful, to the effect that the agreement must
be such as to permit the court to infer that the parties intend to share losses
as well as profits in order for the court to find a joint venture agreement.
We submit that it is ill-advised dicta, inasmuch as the Uniform Partnership
Act, which is frequently applied to joint venture agreements, provides that
partners must "contribute toward the losses, whether capital or otherwise,
sustained by the partnership according to his share in the profits."

But this

language is modified by the preface that the rights set out in the section are
"subject

to

any

Annotated 1953.

agreement"

between

the

partners.

48-1-15

Utah

Code

An agreement that losses are not to be shared may be some

evidence that the parties are not engaged in a joint venture, but it certainly
should not be regarded as conclusive evidence of that fact.

Bassett doesn't

help the appellant in this case, anyway, because an agreement to share in the
losses is implied.
Other cases cited by the appellant do not help him.

We agree with Paul

v. North, 191 Kan. 163, 380 P.2d 421 (1963), that some form of agreement 1s
necessary to establish a joint venture relationship, but there the trial court
on disputed evidence found there was no agreement, whereas in the present
case the trial court on disputed evidence found that there was an agreement
West v.

---

Soto.

85 Ariz.

255,

336 P.Zd

153 (1959),

was an automobile

accident case in which the two defendants were in an automobile for soc1i
purposes.

and the plaintlff was trying to recover damages from both

doesnrt have much relevance to a business transaction such as in\~ol\?ed in ~'"'~

present case.
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In his brief, appellant has made statement wbich simply are not bome
out by the evidence, such as "there was no express joint venture."
abundant

evidence

that there was

an express joint venture.

There ia
What tbe

appellant has done, as so many appellants do, is refer to the testimony of his
own witnesses as it that testimony were gospel, ignoring contrary tutDBony.
The Cranneys and two others testified that an oral qreement for a joiDt
venture was made on May 4, 1977.

Thereafter Galen Ross prepared a joiDt

venture agreement as requested by both parties to it.
testimony

as

to

the occurrences on May 4,

1977,

In addition to tbe

Galen Rosa,

Strand's

associate, did prepare a joint venture agreement (Ex. 22), which contained a
number

of

provisions

which

are

customary

in

such

agreements.

The

agreement was labeled "Joint Venture Agreement" and describes the venture
as for the purpose of buying and selling stock.

There is a provision tor sale

upon mutual agreement but that if it is not sold by June 15 in sufficient
quantity to permit repayment of Jack Cranney's $56,000, he might at his
discretion sell sufficient stock to recapture that investment.

It was provided

that the physical possession of the stock would be held by Jack Cranney,
that after repayment of the two $56, OOOs, the "balance shall jointly belong to
the parties and shall become the capital assets of the partnership between the
parties, to be shared in equal parts."

It provided that proper books and

records would be kept and that neither party would lend, spend or otherwise
encumber the assets without the consent of the other party.

There is a

proqsion that additional money or stock might be added to the venture on
such terms as mutually agreed upon. that the venture might be terminated by
mutual agreement. and that upon termination the assets would be distributed
.n

cln

equal basts "provtded that each party has received $56.000 from the

:.,. "c·c-ed~ •.•t

s:Jle •Jf th" c·enture stock "
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Evidence introduced on the part of the defendants was to the effect that
Mike Strand

read

the agreement and

signed it in the presence of Jack

Cranney, and that Jack Cranney read the agreement and was in agreement
with its terms except for two matters:
into the venture,

the number of shares--800, 000--to go

and inclusion of a provision that Mike Strand would be

responsible for the selling and buying of stock.

Thus there is evidence that

the parties were in agreement upon all of the elements necessary to form a
joint venture, even under the appellant's theories.
It may

be

argued

that

the

joint venture agreement represented by

Exhibit 22 has no significance because it was not signed by both parties.
But it is evidence of what they had in mind, and if they were agreed on what
they had in mind, it didn't make any difference whether the joint venture
agreement was signed or not.

There is no evidence that the parties intended

the written agreement to be a condition precedent to existence of the joint
venture that had been agreed upon in the May 4 meeting.
In General Realty Corporation :'!:. Douglas Lowell, Inc. , 233 Ore. 244.
354 P.2d 306, 310 (1960), two real estate companies had negotiated a contract
and agreed that a written contract would be prepared.

A written contract

was drawn, and was signed by one of the parties, but not by the other·
With respect to the enforceability of the oral agreement entered into prior to
preparation of the written con tract, the court said:
Where parties agree to reduce their agreement to writing, the
question arises as to whether their negotiations constitute a
con tract.
This question usually depends upon their intention, or,
as it is sometimes expressed. upon whether they in tend the wntrng
to be a condition precedent to the taking effect of the agreement.
If the written draft is viewed by the parties merely as a convement
memorial or record of their previous contract. its absence does not
affect the binding force of the contract. tf. howe\·er. it is \'lewed
as the consummation of the negot1ation. there 1s no contr·act until
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the written draft is finally signed. Where the tenu of the CODt:nlet
have in all respects been definitely understood md arreec1 upoD
the failure subsequently to embody such terms in a wrt~
contract, as agreed, does not prevent the contract, where no
statutory objection interposes, from being obliptory UPOD the
parties.
In other words, where all the substantial tenu of the
con tract have been agreed on md there is notbinr lett tor future
settlement, the tact alone that it was the understandinr that the
contract should be formally drawn up md put in wrttmr doee DOt
leave the transaction incomplete and without binding force, in the
absence of a positive agreement that it should not be bindinl uta
so reduced to writing and formally executed.
(Accord:

Restatement ot Contracts, § 26.)

Inasmuch as the May 4 agreement, as expressed and as implied, in

lilbt

of the Partnership Act, was complete, changes made by Mr. Ross did not
affect the enforceability of that agreement.

II

EVEN IF THE AGREEMENT DID NOT AMOUNT TO A JOINT VEN•
TURE, STRAND AND THE CRANNEYS NEVERTHELESS BECAME
CO-OWNERS OF THE STOCK, AND WERE BOUND BY THEIR
AGREEMENTS RELATING TO IT.
In many cases it makes

a difference whether the parties are joint

venturers rather than joint owners, principal and agent, or merely engaged
in a common effort.

This is true when third parties seek to impose liability

on one or more of the parties, or where one ot them claims that the other
occupies a fiduciary relationship.

In those cases liability may depend upon

whether or not the parties are joint venturers.
In this case there was certainly evidence that in the meeting of May 4,
1977.

the parties had agreed that Strand and the Cranneys would become

owners of 800, 000 shares of stock in Classic Mining Corporation, subject to
the

right of

:hereafter.

the Cranneys to recoup $56,000,

and the right of Strand,

to obtain a slffiilar amount, and that they would be co-owners
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thereafter.

There is also evidence that additional shares were put into the

partnership because of Strand's having induced the Cranneys to put up,
first, $29,500 for the acquisition of additional shares, and then an additional

$12,000 needed by Strand.

It

can certainly

be implied that when the

additional funds were put up, that the amounts put up would be returned,
and that when additional shares were put in, they would be divided in the
same manner as the original shares, and this is just what the court did in its
decree.
If the agreement is there, or the court finds it is there, what difference

does it make whether it was a joint venture or something else?
to determine the rights of parties inter se without pasting labels.

It is possible
The rights

of the parties would be the same, as it developed, whether they created a
joint tenancy in the stock or a tenancy in common, and it is possible to
create such tenancies in almost any kind of personal property.
As

stated in 20 Am.Jur.

2d,

Co-tenancy and Joint Ownership, § 6:

While it appears that joint tenancies were originally confined to
interests in real property, it became settled at an early date that a
tenancy of such character can exist in any kind of property that is
susceptible of being possessed in severalty. Accordingly. it is now
generally recognized that there can be a joint tenancy in almost any
kind of personal property, whether it is corporeal, such as goods,
wares, and merchandise, or incorporeal, such as insurance policies,
bank accounts, building and loan association deposits, United States
government bonds, corporation securities, and the equitable interest
of a vendee under contract of purchase of real property. Furthermore, there may be a joint tenancy of a safe deposit box
And in 20 Am.Jur. 2d, Co-tenancy and Joint Ownership, § 25. a similar view
is expressed with respect to tenancy in common:
A tenancy in common mav eXIst in e\·ery spec1es of property--real.
personal, or mixed. a~d corporeal or incxporeal.
Thus. for
example, two or more persons may become tenants in common ,)!
growing crops, of grain or cotton commingled m stc r:1>;-'" .. Jt li\·estock: of a motor \'ehicle or a \·esse!. of chattels generally. ,Jf il
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b:BDk accoun~; ot a lease; ot a mortgage; of miDinc, md pa md ot1
ng~ts; o~ nparian water rights; ot a literary work; of a patent for
an mvention; ot a church pew; and ot a cemetery lot. • • •
Thus,
there was, there is no reason why the agreement shouldn't be eatorc.blil bF
one ot the parties against the others either aa a joint venture or u

a

co- tenancy in the stock under an agreement pursuant to wiW:b certatD ol t1ae
stock is to be used tor repaying investments, and the stock ia thereafter to
be divided on an equal basis.

III
STRAND HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT HE WAS ENTITLED
TO POSSESSION OF THE STOCK.
.
On page 15 of his brief, the appellant asserts that the burden ot proof
was upon the Cranneys to establish that a joint venture existed, which ia
true.

But from that he jumps to the conclusion that it the joint venture is

not proven

he

is

entitled

to

return of the

stock,

failing to give any

consideration to the burden he bears in attempting to gain possession and
control of stock that is in possession of the Cranneys.
In Srdar

~.

Vrooman, 483 P. 2d 976 (Colo. App. 1971), an action was

instituted to recover savings account funds and shares o! stock that had been
transferred to the defendant by the plaintiff's predecessor in interest.

The

action was begun and tried on the theory that the transfers of such funds
and stock were procured through fraud and unlawful taking on the part o!
the defendant.

A jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and on appeal

the plaintiffs contended that the jury verdict could not stand because there
11as no evidence that the transfers were made to defendant in exchange for a
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valid consideration or in discharge of an implied contract for her services.
In rejecting this notion, the court said:
As stated, this action was brought to nullify the transfers to
defendant on the theory of fraud and unlawful taking. The burden
of proving the elements of those assertions rested with plaintiffs.
[Citation omitted. 1 The transfers to the defendant were completed,
and there was no burden upon her to plead affirmatively and prove
consideration or a contractual basis for them.
The trial court
properly restricted the determination of the case to the issues
raised by the plaintiffs.
The present action is essentially a replevin action.

In Henderson v.

Lacey, 347 P.2d 1020 (Okla. 1959), the court said:

***

In a replevin action the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove
that he is the owner of the property in question or has a special
interest therein; that he is entitled to the immediate possession of
the same; that the property is in the possession or under the control of the defendant; and that the defendant has wrongfully
detained the same from the plain tiff.
In Crystal Recreation,

Inc. ,

~.

Seattle Association of Creditmen, 3-l

Wash. 2d 553, 209 P. 2d 358, 361 (1949), the court said:
The plaintiff in a replevin
possession in order to be
can only succeed on the
possession, irrespective of
defendant.

action must prove its title and right to
successful in the action. The plaintiff
strength of its own title and right to
the title or right to possession of the

The above cases are in accord with the general rule as stated in 66 Am.
Jur. 2d, Replevin, § 98:
The plaintiff in an action of replevin, like every other action, has
the burden of proving his case by the preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence. Thus, the burden is upon him to show
that at the time of the commencement of the action he was the
owner of the property sought to be replevied. that he is entitled to
the immediate possession of the property. and that the defendant
wrongfully detains it. The burden does not shift where the answer
pleads property in the defendant. * * *
See also. Her! -v
(1965).

and

Bill

Insurance Com2an \'.

State Bank of Parsons.

Dreiling
~fl

Colo

:'-lotor
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Com pam·
313.

~

\'

195

St

-.,
,_ p :2j 15.;.

Kan
Paul
:) l

35.
Flrl·

·-.

~03

.md

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- :28 -

p :2d ll
\]ar~c

According to the above authorities, the appellant C&DDOt

ret

fi"CCa .......

be is to where he wants to be simply by showing that the CraDD8JI bad

a..

burden of proof on their counterclaim.
bad been entered into which precluded the plaintiff
from

tram rec:overmc the

ltiOck

the Cranneys and concluded that the plaintiff's actioll apjlllt tbe

defendants should be dismissed, with prejudice and on the aeritl••that ia,
the action of replevin to recover the stock.

The only relief the pllmtltf wu

entitled to was that asked for in the counterclaim
that

the

ot

the Cranneys, that ia,

joint venture's affairs be wound up and that the plaintiff and

defendants be distributed their respective shares of the assets.

Certainly

the evidence does not establish that Strand was entitled to immediate possession of the stock of Classic Mining Corporation.
(Respondents recognize that the point is academic, their burden of proof
having been easily carried.)

CONCLUSION
From the evidence adduced, it is fairly inferrable that a plan to pluck
pigeons failed.

A promoter who was making deals for Classic Mining Corpo-

ration, and working to affect the price of its stock, needed capital to accomplish his goals.

The Cranneys, business people who knew little about stocks

and trading, were thought to have money.

If the transactions were properly

cast, and Strand was the one who cast them, he would have two options:

If

the stock increased substantially in value, the Cranneys would be lenders,
but if the bottom fell out, they would be investors.
But things didn't quite work out, because Strand talked of the joint
•:enture and its terms, and about his partner, before too many people, and
'"'cause the law holds him to his bargain despite the absence of many details·
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d

On the basis of the evidence, much of it disputed, much of it dependent
upon credibility,
divided

the court properly found

a

the assets and achieved a just result.

joint venture, meticulously
The judgment should be

affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMlTTED,

B4R~
ROE~

FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

)'l. t(

day of August, 1979, I served the

attached Brief of Respondents upon Richard J. Leedy, Esq. , attorney for
appellant, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mails, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Richard J. Leedy, Esq.
610 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 30 -

